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This article aims to stimulate debate around
publicly-expressed, opposed opinions, on
climate change and to briefly explore the
reasons that could drive these contrary views.
The strong association between an individual’s
concern about the threat of climate change,
and whether they more generally lie on the
right or left of the political spectrum, has been
extensively evidenced in the academic
literature; see, for example, McCright et al.
(2016) and the references therein. Results from
a 2017 Gallup poll in June 2017 indicated that
this partisan divide between Republicans and
Democrats in the USA is growing ever wider.
Compared to a decade earlier, there has been
a rise of over 10 percentage points in Democrats
who worry a great deal about climate change
(66% from 55%), while this percentage for
Republicans has fallen by six percentage points
from an already much lower base (18% from
24%). This helps explain the Trump
administration’s position on the Paris
Agreement.
In the highly heated exchanges in online
forums, those on the political left often assign
the unwillingness of ‘climate deniers’ to accept
the urgency to act on reducing greenhouse gas
emissions as evidence of narrow vested interests,
stubbornness and general scientific stupidity.
Similarly, those who make the strongest case
for climate change action are disparaged as
‘watermelons’ (Delingpole, 2012)—green on
the outside and red on the inside, where
environmentalism is used as a stealth
mechanism to action a socialist agenda via the
back door.
While there is no doubt some truth in both
these sets of accusations for a minority of people,
they do not strike me as being helpful for a
meaningful discussion on how to move forward
the policy agenda. As Sun Tzu (explain) noted,
‘If you know yourself but not the enemy, for
every victory gained you will also suffer a
defeat’. Ridiculing those who disagree with us
cannot fully equate to understanding as, even
among the expert community. Pindyck (2016)
has documented large disagreements over how
much should be spent to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions. I therefore briefly propose a
framework that combines moral foundation
theory, rational learning, and differences in
individual ethical preferences that I think will
allow for improved discourse.
Moral foundation theory is beautifully
explained in Haidt (2013). Its essence is that we
have five moral taste-buds that are rooted deep
within ourselves. These relate to caring; fairness;
loyalty to the group; respect and authority; and
sanctity. There is a clear association between
the way we individually weight the importance
of each of these issues, our political affiliations
and our personality traits. In particular, the
political left place very strong emphasis on
caring and fairness at the expense of the last
three, while the political right weight them
more evenly. Because of the innate nature of
our moral taste buds, our genetic makeup is
strongly associated not only with our personality
but also our political beliefs (for example Hatemi
and McDermott, 2012; Verhulstet al., 2012).
Within this framework, we do not form political
arguments for our own benefit—our
unconscious selves have broadly decided on
the right answer to a political question long
before our rational minds are awakened—but,
instead, for the persuasion of others. Given the
issues of caring and fairness both to poorer
societies and future generations that are entailed
in the climate change debate, it is unsurprising
that the left/right divide on this matter has
been linked to moral foundation theory (for
example Markowitz and Shariff, 2012). While
this may come as something of a shock to the
rationalists, the chances are that you had, to a
significant degree, determined your policy
position on climate change long before you
seriously assessed any evidence on the subject.
Of course, individuals should move from
their initial stance as they update their views
based on increasingly detailed scientific
information. But the evidence on this is sketchy.
For example, Kahan et al. (2012) finds no
evidence that scientific illiteracy is greater
among climate change sceptics but, instead,
that knowledge increases polarization. Bolsen
and Druckman (2016) also find increased
polarization, but no evidence that any group is
willing to pay more to prevent climate change,
as they become more scientifically informed
(see also Deryugina and Shurchkov, 2016). In
a recent paper, I argue that this might be the
consequence of purely rational behaviour
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(Freeman, 2017). As climate skeptics receive
more information, their mean estimate of future
climate change becomes greater, but they also
become less concerned about potentially
catastrophic outcomes. Greater knowledge
reduces uncertainty, lowering the insurance
premium that they are prepared to pay.
Scientific communication alone does not,
therefore, result in harmonization of policy
positions. On the basis of this evidence, I
conjecture that, however much research you
have done on this topic, your policy views will
have remained largely unchanged over time. It
is rare indeed to find a climate skeptic who
becomes a policy advocate, or vice versa, and
we do not need explanations based on vested
interests, stupidity or political stealth to explain
this phenomenon.
Finally, we all take different ethical positions
on a number of key issues that are relevant for
the climate change debate; I highlight two
here. First, the more impatient we are, the less
prepared we will be to act to prevent damage to
future generations—this would involve giving
up consumption now for benefits in the far
future that we are not readily prepared to wait
for. More formally, ‘impatience’ refers to a
higher utility discount rate. If this parameter
value is high, then anticipated future utility
gains from climate change mitigation are heavily
discounted when calculating welfare. As a
consequence, the present values of projects
that reduce greenhouse gas emissions are low.
Yet our impatience depends on a large number
of features; not least our age (Read and Read,
2004) and gender (Dittrich and Leipold, 2014)
and, indeed, can even be manipulated even for
a given individual (Lempert and Phelps, 2016).
In a recent survey, my co-authors and I found
significant disagreement among discounting
experts on how impatient a social planner
should be when addressing long-term problems
(Drupp et al., 2015).
Second, the value that individuals place on
the environment itself varies enormously. For
example, McCauley (2006, p. 27) presents the
opinion that ‘the aggregate value of a chunk of
nature—its aesthetic beauty, cultural
importance and evolutionary significance—is
infinite’, while others place much greater value
on current human life. Given that many of
these ethical differences are irreducible
(Freeman and Groom, 2015), we cannot expect
people to come to similar policy conclusions on
this matter however much we debate with
them. A further issue for discussion is the range
of estimates of the effectiveness of different
climate change preventative measures.
Given the strong influence our genetics
and personality have on our political views and
the strong correlation this has with the climate
change debate, the apparent inability of
scientific communication to bridge this policy
divide, and irreducible differences over ethical
matters concerning time and the value of the
environment, disagreement over climate
change policy is fundamentally inevitable. This
leads me to the view that we should try to
understand each other’s positions better and
engage in less name-calling before concluding
that, in the end, I am the one who is right after
all.
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Barry Pemberton and Wilson Ng*
Nuclear technologies create a number of
potential inter-generational equity problems
that require effective governance (Pemberton,
2016). This article raises a number of concerns
with the regulation, governance and
accountability practices associated with nuclear
power production. Can this problem be resolved
with incremental reforms or is fundamental
governance restructuring required?
On 28 December 2016, The Times ran an
article suggesting that the UK Office for Nuclear
Regulation (ONR) had become ‘too close to the
industry to police it’ (Moody, 2016). The
background to this article includes concerns
over accidents considered to be ‘of no nuclear
safety significance’ (ibid.), although those
accidents included workers’ exposure to
radioactive material. The ONR was established
as a statutory public corporation under the
Energy Act 2013 to regulate the nuclear industry
(ONR, 2016) and reports to the Department
for Work and Pensions. Its predecessor was the
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) and
the ONR continues the NII’s close relationship
with government.
The issue of problematic regulators is
gaining importance given current
developments within the UK nuclear industry,
its track record and implications for inter-
generational equity. This article identifies three
issues that frame the challenges associated with
the future governance and accountability of
the UK’s nuclear industry.
Three issues of (mis-)governance
Poor transparency
Our first concern is the poor transparency of
the UK’s nuclear industry. The industry has
been in a period of decline, which began with
its privatization in the late 1990s. Sizewell B,
the last reactor built, entered service in 1995
and, together with ageing gas-cooled reactors,
forms the remnants of a once-prized industry,
now owned by the French company EDF.
However, even Sizewell B is expected to close
by 2035 (WNA 2016).
Given this decline, the industry has a serious
environmental legacy relating to redundant
hazardous sites and nuclear waste with
significant inter-generational impacts
(Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,
2002). Further, the nuclear industry is
characterized by a lack of public accountability
attributed to an endemic culture of secrecy
arising from the industry’s military work
(Williams, 1980). Despite apparently being
heavily regulated, strategic decisions received
insufficient public scrutiny and public funds
were mis-allocated (Durie and Edwards, 1982).
This has led to the UK’s nuclear policy being
described as the ‘most expensive failure of
post-war British policy-making’ (Huhne, 2011).
Announcements of a possible nuclear
renaissance, manifest in the planned reactor at
Hinkley Point, raise further concerns relating
to accountability, governance and regulatory
issues, particularly given the risks associated
with foreign investment in a UK nuclear plant.*© 2018 Barry Pemberton.




The environmental and economic sustainability
of the nuclear industry has been persistently
questioned. In 1996 the industry was
restructured by splitting it into sites deemed
commercially viable and legacy sites that
required public subsidies. This restructuring
required the government to undertake a
‘complex capital restructuring and relisting in
2005’ (Jupe, 2012, p. 125), which effectively
created an uncapped liability for these
‘commercially viable’ sites to be funded by UK
taxpayers (McKerron, 2012). The legacy sites
and nuclear waste retained in public ownership
have no credible source of funding for legacy
sites’ liabilities, despite the existence of a
government-approved three-year plan (NDA,
2008; 2016). The Nuclear Decommissioning
Authority (NDA), who own these legacy sites,
noted that the efficacy of this funding
arrangement is ‘largely attributable to factors
over which it has limited or no control’ (NDA,
2008, p. 43). Therefore, liabilities, held in the
public or private sector, will require
undetermined levels of funding by taxpayers.
Yet, management control over legacy sites have
been heavily criticised (PAC, 2013; 2014; 2015).
Recent figures suggest that publicly-held
liabilities are estimated as £161 billion, which is
a 30% increase since 2003 (NDA, 2016, p. 11).
Inter-generational equity and the nuclear legacy
The long-lived and toxic nature of the nuclear
industry’s legacy creates the need for a unique
approach to resolve its problems, for example
the disposal and treatment of nuclear waste.
Forty years ago, a Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution advised the UK
government to resolve the inter-generational
problem of nuclear waste. A subsequent report
on nuclear power and the environment
(Flowers, 1976) advised that there should be no
commitment to a nuclear power programme
until the government had demonstrated ‘the
safe containment of highly radioactive waste
for the indefinite future’ (Blowers and Pepper,
1987, p. 141). Nevertheless, the UK still does
not have any solutions for the disposal of the
waste from nuclear sites, leaving a legacy for
future generations.
Questions for debate
Questions urgently in need of further research
are:
•Given claims that the government’s poor
governance and decision-making was
attributed to lack of transparency and poor
public accountability, what accounting and
accountability reforms are required of the
regulators and those responsible for the
governance of nuclear sites?
 •The financial and environmental hazards
associated with nuclear technologies are
significant. The inter-generational equity
associated with the industry’s legacy costs
remain incalculable but will fall upon future
generations. What governance systems are
considered appropriate for the nuclear
industry in order to assure the sustainability
of current and future liabilities?
•The unresolved and potentially catastrophic
hazards of nuclear waste may seriously affect
the health and natural environment of UK
citizens far into the foreseeable future. What
accountability and governance solutions are
required to deal with these social and
environmental hazards?
UK regulations introduced over 60 years
ago are clearly in urgent need of fundamental
reform. The current situation is problematic in
that a highly toxic unaccountable industry,
which creates incalculable, unfunded liabilities
to be paid by future taxpayers, appears to be
neither governed nor regulated effectively.
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This article aims to stimulate debate on how
integrated thinking and reporting can
contribute to value creation for university
stakeholders and help to achieve the UN’s
sustainable development goals (SDGs).
Universities have significant influence over a
large proportion of the world’s future leaders.
Reporting, managing, engaging and
developing strategy on sustainable
development issues therefore stands to have
considerable impact. Similarly, the way students
are educated can be a force for change (see
Adams et al., 2011). Universities thus had the
potential to make one of the biggest impacts of
any sector through sustainability reporting and
stand to be among the biggest beneficiaries of
integrated thinking and integrated reporting.
Yet despite 20 years of developments in
sustainability reporting and more than five in
integrated reporting, the annual reporting
packages of universities have barely changed.
They are largely unimaginative and backward-
looking consisting of compliance disclosures,
financial statements and explication of
governance structures and management teams
with some unverifiable ‘feel good’ information
thrown in.
Universities have largely ignored global,
cross-sectoral, multi-stakeholder developments
in accounting for sustainability. Further, in
contrast to efforts to develop ‘integrated
thinking’ in the corporate world (Adams,
2017a), university structures and strategies
continue to reflect functional and discipline
silos (notwithstanding some admirable attempts
to develop interdisciplinary research) and a
separation of the academic from the
operational. In making this statement I draw
on over two decades of experience involving:
cross-sectoral research in sustainability
accounting and management processes and
judging sustainability reports for awards;
working with a number of standard- and
guideline-setters to develop reporting on
sustainable development issues; working as a
professor and senior manager in universities;
developing award-winning sustainability
reports and management systems in a
university; and, advising on integrated
reporting and sustainability disclosures in other
sectors.
The benefit to a university (and its
stakeholders) of working out how it creates
value and for whom (i.e. developing the value
creation statement of an integrated report) is
incalculable. The resulting statement would
resonate much more than the bland and
undifferentiated vision and mission statements
(often involving mention of a higher position
in rankings) which populate university websites.
Universities depend on financing from
students (and their parents and/or the
community), governments, industry and
alumni, but they do not set out their ‘business
model’ for making a contribution to the
economic, social and environmental welfare of
these providers of finance in a systematic way.
Few university reports consider how their
business model draws on and transforms
multiple capitals (people, buildings, natural
resources, relationships with stakeholders,
systems and processes as well as finance) to
create value.
As a result, the value a university creates
through relationships with various stakeholders
(including students, professional and
government bodies, for example), the education
it provides and its research is perhaps not
considered in a systematic or holistic way when
developing strategy. (See Adams, 2017a on the
role reporting and board/council involvement
in reporting play in influencing thinking and
action.) Indeed, university engagement with
stakeholders tends to be ad hoc, unsystematic
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and decentralized, thus raising questions as to
its ability to pick up material ‘external
environment’ risks and opportunities for
incorporation into strategy. This is in part
inferred from the lack of reporting to or
identification of key stakeholders, how the
universities engage with them and what their
material issues are. Such disclosure is a feature
of corporate sustainability and integrated
reports.
Disclosure of a forward-looking strategy
which considers economic, social and
environmental risks and opportunities drives
better strategic thinking and more value
creation—and integrated reporting provides a
framework for doing this. In a university, this
might reasonably be expected to cover the
provision of education and encouragement of
research which addresses the risks and
opportunities arising from a climate changed
world with all the issues (such as energy, water
and food security; increased poverty; inequality;
refugee populations) that brings. After all, these
changes will impact on every person, every job
and every industry. Engagement between
academic and operational staff on the quest to
create value, as broadly defined and with
reference to key stakeholders, can result in
innovative collaborations and student projects
which enhance operational outcomes.
The university sector has come under fire
in recent years from national governments for
lack of real impact (as distinct from measures of
citation which, in any case, reflect that a large
proportion of published research is not
influential) of much of research. A value creation
statement ought to curb the folly of university
obsession with journal rankings which, certainly
in accounting, can privilege North American
accounting journals many of which rarely
publish work outside their jurisdiction. Such
rankings fail to adjust for the fact these journals
can accrue higher citations because North
America has a large proportion of accounting
academics that research and use prior research
work conducted in their own country. These
journals have displayed (through their contents
pages) a reluctance to publish innovative
qualitative research, for example addressing
accounting for sustainable development, and
developing new theorizing and concepts to
explain contemporary developments which can
inform business school education. This issue
has even received attention from the Prince of
Wales and his Accounting for Sustainability
charity (accountingforsustainability.org).
Emphasising the extent of the problem, an
email received in October 2017 from one
publisher highlighted that 50% of articles
published were included in the CiteScore, which
calculates the citations from all documents in a
particular year to all documents published in
the previous three years for a particular journal.
This means that as well as not having any real
impact, much published research is not even
influencing other researchers.
The situation has resulted in governments
implementing means of assessing and
rewarding research which makes a difference
to practice and policy. A particular impetus for
change comes from governments around the
world committing to 17 SDGs. Universities are
central to achievement of all 17 goals and
governments may hold them accountable for
making a contribution. Adams (2017b) provides
practical guidance on how contribution to the
SDGs can be aligned with strategy to create
value.
If universities can figure out how they
create value, and develop strategies which
reflect dependence on multiple capitals and a
systematic approach to identifying broader risks
and opportunities, they might stave off
government intervention in their affairs and
reduce reliance on flawed approaches to
ranking. In the UK, the British Universities
Finance Directors Group (BUFDG, 2016; 2017)
and the Leadership Foundation for Higher
Education are hoping to guide universities in
this endeavour. The challenge for the sector
will be not to assume universities need a special
set of guidelines as has occurred with
sustainability reporting, to the detriment of
quality and quantity.
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